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ABSTRACT
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a key technology for providing private
storage and querying on untrustedmachines but is commonly seen
as impractical due to the high overhead of the re-randomization,
called the eviction, the client incurs. We propose in this work to
securely delegate the eviction to semi-trusted third parties to en-
able any client to accede the ORAM technology and present four
different designs inspired by mix-net technologies with reasonable
periodic costs.
1 INTRODUCTION
Thanks to cloud technologies, people have been able to seamlessly
store impressive amounts of data on remote servers. Besides acces-
sibility, availability and integrity, the storage providers also have to
ensure to their clients the data’s and themeta data’s confidentiality
and secure them from not only external adversaries but also from
the cloud itself. They thus employ cryptographic mechanisms to
protect the communication channels, such as user authentication,
data encryption and integrity checking. These, however, do not
prevent the leakage of all meta data: the servers can monitor user
activities and watch which records are accessed.
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [15], or Oblivious Storage [7], precisely
prevents an adversary from observing the record access. In these
schemes, the records are first locally encrypted and permuted in
a new order before being uploaded to the untrusted cloud storage.
When the user seeks a given record, the local client computes the
corresponding remote index, fetches the encrypted data block and
decrypts it. After a number of accesses, the database is random-
ized locally by the client to bring to naught any leaked information
from the accesses: this is the "eviction process".
This eviction is the main bottleneck of ORAM. Indeed, the evic-
tion consists in randomizing the whole database by permuting the
records and refreshing their encryption so that an adversary loses
any insight on the correspondence between the remote and local,
or virtual and real, record indices. However, as we assume the num-
ber of records stored remotely to be orders of magnitude higher
than what the client can store, the client has to download and ran-
domize the database during the eviction in chunks, and do so sev-
eral times so that all record ordering is equally likely. Thus as the
database size grows, the eviction cost rises super linearly.
This is why we propose in this work to delegate the eviction
process to dedicated semi-trusted parties. Doing so, light-weight
clients could accede the ORAM technology and thanks to the use
of mix networks [8] inspired designs, ORAM would become more
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portable.
In this work, we present several privacy friendly distributed sys-
tems inspired by mix-nets to safely delegate ORAM’s randomiza-
tion process to semi-trusted third parties. Their advantages include
the reduction of the client computation, the possibility to delay the
eviction to quieter times, the guaranteed database availability dur-
ing the eviction process regardless of the ORAM design and the
independence from centralized parties. However careful design is
required to make them scalable. Our contributions are as follows:
• We introduce and motivate the use of mix-net to construct
delegated ORAM eviction schemes, letting very thin clients
use most ORAM designs.
• We present a number of eviction schemes relying on mix-
net, improve them with load balancing via parallel mixing.
• We finally evaluate the performance of our delegated evic-
tion designs, compare them between each other and with
regular eviction schemes.
We first present the related work in Section 2. We then intro-
duce the ORAM model and how our model differ, its associated
threat model and explain the different costs in Section 3. We then
present two simple designs over a cascade mix-net and optimize
them using random transposition shuffles over a stratified mix-net
in Section 4. We then hand out our security arguments in Section 5,
evaluate and discuss our designs in Section 6 and Section 7 before
concluding.
2 RELATED WORK
ORAM. ORAM was first presented by Goldreich and Ostrovsky
in 1990 [29] to prevent reverse engineering and protect software
running on tamper resistant CPUs. The model was also formally
extended in 2011 [7] to data protection on untrusted remote clouds
and in 2015 some designs were evaluated on Amazon Simple Stor-
age Service (S3) [? ]. Since its introduction, ORAM enhancements
have been proposed including data structures diversification [16,
32–34], the use of more and more sophisticated security definitions
with statistical security [1, 10] and differential privacy [35], and
the revision of item lookups with cuckoo hashing [31] and bloom
filters [37]. Most ORAM constructions are based on a single client-
server model, but multi-user designs were gradually introduced
[4, 14, 20].
Shuffling and Sorting. Shuffle and sorting algorithms are a thor-
oughly researched subject central to ORAM for the randomization
process. However most of the existing methods are not useful for
ORAM as they are not oblivious in that the permutations done de-
pends on the data itself. Examples of oblivious sorting algorithms
include sorting networks such as Batcher’s [5] and the ones based
1
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on AKS [2], which unfortunately were proven to be impractical be-
cause of the high number of I/Os, but also more recent and efficient
ones [30]. Newer designs include the randomized Shellsort [17], an
elegant simple data-oblivious version of the Shellsort algorithm,
the Zig Zag sort [18] presented in 2014, the Melbourne shuffle [28]
and work of particular interest written by Goodrich in 2012 [19]
assess the information leakage due the use of a partially compro-
mised parallel mix-net.
Mix-nets.Mix-nets were first presented for anonymous e-mailing
by David Chaum in 1981 [8]. As they became popular many im-
provements were made over the years [11–13, 27]. Mix-nets’ main
goal is to give users anonymity by hiding the correspondence be-
tween the incoming users’ packets and the mix-nets output. To do
so, the users’ messages go through several mixes which permute
them and refresh their encryption. Either re-encryption [36] and
onion encryption can be used, proofs of shuffle [6, 21, 22] and Ran-
domized Partial Checking [23] can help verify the shuffle correct-
ness.
This work is inspired by the mix-net technology for its encryp-
tion and permutation functionalities, however, only the packet un-
linkability property is of interest for ORAM. From now on, we re-
fer traditional ORAM solutions as ORAM and our designs as Mix-
ORAM.
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 ORAM introduction
The Oblivious RAM system is a distributed system composed of
two parties, the ORAM server and the client. The server handles
two data arrays, a first one we call the database which comprises
the user’s encrypted records and a temporary one that we call the
cache which is of lesser size and used to hide the number of times
a record was accessed. Only read and write operations are allowed
on these arrays. The client comprises a small memory in which the
cache and some additional records can fit and provides two main
methods, the ORAM records access and eviction.
As stated in Bindschaedler’s work [? ], most ORAM algorithms
can be classified in four distinct families, the layered ORAM, the
partition-basedORAM, the large-message ORAMand the tree-based
ORAM, depending on the database structure and the evictionmethod
employed. In this workwe consider all algorithms that rely on peri-
odic data-oblivious shuffle of the database. This excludes from the
scope of our study solutions relying on the tree-based architecture
or using higher client memory and the use of recursive algorithms
such as [33? ] or as Path ORAM [34] which uses O (logn) private
memory and O
((logn)2) access overhead. We can now thus de-
scribe the client methods as follows.
The access method: In order to perform a read or a write opera-
tion, the client first downloads if needs be the cache and checks lo-
cally whether the desired record is present. If so, a dummy record is
fetched from the database, else the client fetches the desired record.
The cache is then updated with a newly encrypted version of the
fetched element before finally being uploaded back to the remote
ORAM server.
The eviction method: When the cache is full, the client starts
the eviction process to prevent too important information leakage.
The eviction consists of two parts where the client first rebuilds the
database before starting the oblivious shuffle.
During the rebuild phase, the client obliviously uploads back the
records from the cache back to the ORAM database. After doing
so, the client can finally starts the oblivious shuffle during which
chunks of the database are permuted and encrypted obliviously
before being sent back to the database.
Current ORAM solutions have so far relied on the client locally
encrypting and shuffling the records in an obliviousmanner. Batcher’s
sorting network [5] for instance requiresO
(
n(logn)2) I/Os, AKS [2]
or Zig-zag sorting networks [18] which use O (n logn) I/Os but
with large constant factors or finally the Melbourne Shuffle [28]
which is not not based on a data-oblivious sorting algorithm, using
onlyO
(√
n
)
I/Os but with a large and fixed message size ofO
(√
n
)
.
We propose in this paper a new oblivious shuffle performed by
semi-trusted third parties, the difficulty of which being that the
records must be shuffled in a scalable way without leaking infor-
mation about the correspondence between indices to any party.
In this paper, we will reuse the previously defined system with
the addition of the mix-net, a group of independent servers capa-
ble of encryption and permutation, and the following modification
of the oblivious shuffle. When starting the delegated eviction, the
client first selects a set of mixes which will randomize the database.
It then generates and sends to them randomization instructions.
The mixes use these to compute the encryption keys and permuta-
tion seeds and fetch their allocated records from the database. They
then randomize the records by encrypting and shuffling themwith
the keys and seeds, and forward them to the next mix(es) in what
we call a round. This randomization process is then done a num-
ber of times as specified in the instructions before the records are
uploaded back to the database ready to be accessed.
3.2 Security definitions and Threat model
We presume here the existence of a motivated adversary trying to
subvert a target user’s privacy by learning the correspondence be-
tween the remote and the local record indices. We furthermore as-
sume that the user protects its data with an ORAM system compli-
ant with the Privacy Definition 1 introduced by Stefanov et al. [33]
(see below) and additionally that all communications between the
client, ORAM server and mixes are secured but may be intercepted
as in the global passive adversary assumption. Finally, we suppose
the adversary has corrupted theORAMserver and all but onemixes,
and that the compromised machines behave in a honest but curi-
ous way in that all operation are correctly performed but passively
recorded and all secrets shared with the adversary.
Privacy Definition 1. Let’s denote a sequence of k queries by
seqk = {(op1, ad1, data1), ... , (opk , adk , datak )}, where op denotes
a read or write operation, ad the address where to process the oper-
ation and data the block to write if needs be else ⊥. We denote by
ORAM(seqk ) the resulting randomized data access from the ORAM
2
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process with input seqk . The ORAM guarantees that ORAM(seqk )
and ORAM(seq′
k′) are computationally indistinguishable if k = k ′.
This work focuses on the ORAM eviction process and more pre-
cisely on the oblivious shuffle problem where sequences of data-
blocks are shuffled and encrypted in order to hide the correspon-
dance between records indices after a number of accesses has been
performed. This problem refers to the eviction of the shelter in the
database in the Square Root solution [29] and to the eviction of
upper partitions in a lower ones in the Hierarchical case [16]. We
consider the threat of a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adver-
sary and evaluate the security of our designs by looking at the
information leakage of the oblivious shuffle and at the correctness
of the cryptography methods used by the designs.
3.3 Cryptographic Primitives
PRG&Seeds.ORAMsystems use pseudo random generators (PRG)
and seeds to link remote and real indices. A distribution D over
strings of length l is said pseudo random if D is indistinguishable
from the uniform distribution over strings of length l [24]. That
means it is infeasible for any probabilistic polynomial-time adver-
sary to tell whether the string was sampled accordingly to D or
was chosen uniformly at random. A PRG is a deterministic algo-
rithm that receives as an input a short random key and stretches
it into a long pseudo random stream.
Encryption. ORAM designs heavily rely on encryption to obfus-
cate the records during the eviction and the access. In this work
we will use symmetric encryption for its rapidity and also public
encryption for the key and seeds derivation. The Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES) [9] has high speed and low RAM require-
ments: it has throughput over 700 MB/s per thread on recent CPUs
such as the Intel Core i3 [26] which makes it the ideal choice for
ORAM. We also make use of elements of a elliptic curve group of
prime order satisfying the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption
to compress the instructions sent to the mixes.
3.4 Model
System. We consider in this work an ORAM remote server con-
sisting of a database with memory of n b-bit long data blocks and
a cache with memory of s, s ≪ n, b-bit long data blocks. We fur-
thermore consider a mix-net composed of m mixes, and a client
with memory of s data blocks. The ORAM server, the mixes and
the client additionally have a small memory of capacity O(m) to
store extra information about the permutation and encryption. We
consider facing the threat of a PPT adversary and call κ our secu-
rity parameter representing the length of our encryption keys and
permutation seeds that we denote by k and σ respectively.
Costs. We are interested on one side in the costs incurred by the
client for recovering a record index, for decrypting a record and the
extra space needed, on the other side in the total costs incurred by
the mixes encrypting the records, permuting them and the trans-
ferring them. Some operations can be preprocessed by the mixes
while the records are being transferred, as the key and seeds gen-
eration and the record allocation, and as thus will not be the main
focus.
4 MIX-ORAM
This work aims at obviously sorting the database from an old state
Πσ (DB) to a new one Πσ ′(DB) with the aid of a mix-net. As the
seed space is not structured, it is a NP-hard problem to find for
any σ1 another seed σ2 such that Πσ2 ◦ Πσ1 = I , the overall mix-
net is limited to perform a permutation Πσ ′′ such that Πσ ′(DB) =
Πσ ′′ ◦ Πσ (DB). We present two ways to do the oblivious shuffle.
We call the first way the Layered method which consists in having
the mixes permute the records with independent random seeds,
i.e. the permutation layers are simply stacked, and the client stor-
ing the indices. We call the second way the Rebuild method where
the mixes obliviously undo the permutations done at the previous
done, Πσ , before shuffling the records with new random seeds.
In this section, we first introduce the twomethods to randomize
the records during the eviction over a simple cascade mix-net. We
then optimize the Mix-ORAM schemes by considering a stratified
mix-net together with distributed shuffle algorithms.
4.1 A simple Mix-ORAM
We introduce here the two randomization methods over a semi-
trusted cascade mix-net, a topology in which themixes receive and
process a batch of packets sequentially has shown in Figure 1. For
each method, we show how the mix-net encrypts and permutes
the records and how the client recovers a record plain text.
4.1.1 Cascade Layered scheme. In this scheme, we use the the
layered encryption method over the cascade mix-net for the evic-
tion of the database. The underlying principle of the layeredmethod
is to have the whole database go through the mix-net once, with
eachmix independently encrypting and permuting the records. This
method corresponds to the sole Wrapping phase (3) of Figure 1.
We assume in the Layered method that the records were prepro-
cessed before being uploaded to the ORAM server as follows. Each
record is first appended with its current index used as label and an
initialization (IV) token as shown in Figure 1. The resulting data
structure is then encrypted in two stages with AES in CBC mode.
The label and record are first encrypted together using the IV to-
ken as initialization vector then the IV token is encrypted with the
first bits of the label-record cipher. All the data structures are then
permuted and finally uploaded to the ORAM server, while their
indices are locally stored on the client.
IV token label || record
8 · ⌈log(n)/8⌉ bit 8 · ⌈log(n)/8⌉ +b bit
Table 1: Layered method data structure.
In the following, we present theMix instructions sent to the mix-
net, used for retrieving the records from the ORAM database and
compute the permutation seeds and encryption keys and the Mix
3
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DB
Status
k0, (σ ,k1)
M1
’k1,1’
σ1
... Mm
’k1,m ’
σm
Mm
k ′0,1, k0,m
... M1
k ′0,m , k0,m
Mm
k ′1,m
σ ′m
... M1
k ′1,1
σ ′i=1
DB
Status
k ′0, (σ ′,k ′1)
(1) Unwrapping
D/Π−1 phase (2) Simple E/D phase
(3) Wrapping
E/Π phase
Figure 1: Cascade Mix-ORAM.
Rebuild method (all phases) and Layered method (only the Wrapping phase)
operations. The client decryption and access methods are then de-
tailed in the Client operations.
Mix instructions. To start the eviction, the client sends to each mix
Mi the ordered list of mixes list = (ports, ips) involved in the
oblivious shuffle, the database access information db , the security
parameter κ , and αi , an element of a cyclic group of prime order
satisfying the decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption.
C → Mi : db, αi , κ, list
Let д be a generator of the prime-order cyclic group G satisfy-
ing the Diffie-Hellman Assumption and q the prime order of G.
We assume that each mix Mi has a public key yi = дxi ∈ G∗ with
xi ∈R Zq being its private key. We also assume that the list of
(mixi ,yi ) is distributed in a authenticated way thanks to a Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI). To generate the αs, the client pick at ran-
dom in Zq for each mixMi the element zi . The group elements and
mixes’ private keys are used to generate the shared secrets ss from
which the encryption keys and permutation seeds are derived with
the aid of the HKDF derivation function [25] as follows:
αi = д
zi ; ssi = y
zi
i = α
xi
i ; ki , σi = hkdf(ssi , κ)
Mix operations.ThemixMi first decrypts theMix instructions, gen-
erates the encryption key ki and the permutation seed σi . The mix
then receives the records from the mix Mi−1 or fetch them if it is
the first mix in the list. It then encrypts all the data structures with
the new encryption key k ′i as said previously and permutes them
with the new seed σ ′i before sending it to Mi+1 or the database if
Mi is the last mix in the list.
Client Operations. The client can find the record index locally as it
was stored previously. To decrypt a record, the client uses a trial
and error recursive algorithm : the client first decrypts the data-
block successively with all the shared secrets set by the latest Mix
instructions and decrypts it another time with its private key. If
the label is the record index, the process stops and the record is
returned. If not, the data-block is re-encrypted with the client’s
private key and the algorithm restarts with the newly encrypted
record and the shared secrets used in older Mix instructions.
We moreover modify the Access method to prevent timing at-
tacks as follows. When accessing a record, the client now directly
encrypts the data-block with its own private key and updates it in
the local cache. The client then uploads the cache to the remote
server. After doing so, the client can perform the read/write oper-
ation: it either overwrites the record with its new version ; either
decrypts the recordwith its private key and then starts the trial and
error algorithm. Once the plain text is retrieved, the client finally
encrypts the record a last time with its private key and stores it lo-
cally and at the next eviction overwrites the cached version with it.
Costs. As the whole database is sent through the mix-net, the mix
communication cost is (m + 1) · n · b , the mix permutation cost
ismnCΠ(n) with CΠ(n) the cost of permuting n elements and the
encryption costmnCcbc withCcbc the cost of encrypting one data
block. The client Lookup cost is of the order O(1) thanks to the n
indices stored locally for a total of n log(n) bits. We will discuss of
the decryption cost in the Evaluation Section 6 as it depends on the
average number of encryption layers, however 2κm bits are used
to store locally the group elements given that we always blind the
samem elements.
4.1.2 Cascade Rebuild scheme. The rebuild method aims at re-
placing all the mix encryption and permutation layers with new
ones ; the key challenge here is that the intermediaries should
never see the underlying client records. In order to achieve this,
the records are encrypted and decrypted in two phases : a sim-
ple encryption-decryption ((2) E/D phase) and then an encryption-
permutation ((1) the Unwrapping phase and (3) theWrapping phase)
as shown in Figure 1. We use in the Rebuild method the AES en-
cryption method in Counter mode and take as counter the record
current index.
Before uploading the records to the untrusted storage for the
first time, the client prepares the data as follows. The records are
first encrypted with the client own private keys. The first encryp-
tion keys and permutation seeds are then generated and used to en-
crypt the records once with fixed counters and another time while
permuting the records at the same time (with varying counters), i.e.
locally doing the Simple Encryption phase (2) and the Wrapping
phase (3) of Figure 1.
Mix instructions.The client sends to eachmix the same information
as in the Cascade Layered design but with two group elements :
αi being used to undo the old permutations and decrypt the old
encryption layers (in the Unwrapping and E/D phase), and α ′i used
for the new encryption and permutations (in the E/D phase and the
Wrapping phase). The client thus send to each mixMi :
C → Mi : db, αi , α ′i , κ, list
4
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The mix Mi thus computes the permutation seeds and encryp-
tion keys as follows.
αi = д
zi , ssi = y
zi
i , ki ,σi = hkd f (ssi , κ)
α ′i = д
zi , ss ′i = y
z′i
i , k
′
i ,σ
′
i = hkd f (ss ′i , κ)
Mix operations. In this scheme, the mix Mi receives a list of en-
crypted records from the mix Mj or fetch the database if it is the
first mix. During the Unwrapping phase, themixes remove first the
old encryption and then the permutations thanks to the old keys
ki and seeds σi and send the records to Mi+1, the last mix Mm in-
stead sends them to itself. The mixes then in the simple E/D phase
encrypt the records with both the new and old keys thanks to AES
in Counter mode commutativity and send to the previous mix in
the list, with the first mixM0 sending it to the last mixMm . Finally,
in theWrapping phase, the records are permutedwith σ ′i , and then
encrypted withk ′i and sent toMi−1 or the database for the firstmix.
Client operations. To find a record index, the client uses the lastm
seeds to simulate the mix permutations during the previous evic-
tion or the preprocess.
When retrieving a record, the client first computes the record’s
remote index using the permutation seeds. The client saves all in-
termediary and final indices and use them as counters to decrypt
the record sequentially r times. The client then decrypts the record
with all the shared secrets and its own encryption key together
with the original index as counter to reveal the plain-text. The
client then updates the encryption of the record to read or write
in the local cache, and uploads the cache back to the ORAM server.
Costs. As the whole database is sent through the mix-net three
times, the mix communication cost is (3m) ·n ·b , the mix permuta-
tion cost is 2mnCΠ(n)withCΠ(n) the cost of permuting n elements
and the encryption cost 4mnCctr withCctr the cost of encrypting
one data block. The client Lookup cost is of the ordermCΠ(n). The
client decryption cost is 2mCctr , and the group elements stored on
the client requires 2κm bits of storage.
Both of the Cascade Layered and Cascade Rebuild designs are
not efficient as they do no fully utilize the mixes’ capacity: for a
single user only one mix works at a time. However, the designs
can be used in pipeline when dealing with several users.
To increase the mix-net efficiency, we next study in the follow-
ing section parallelization to distribute the workload among mixes
while keeping the shuffle oblivious. To do so, we change the mix-
net configuration to a stratified one and introduce random trans-
position shuffles.
4.2 Parallelizing the Eviction process.
From here on, we replace the cascade configuration of the mix-net
with a stratified one and have the mixes simulate random transpo-
sition shuffles (RTS) thanks to the use of private and public permu-
tations. We also calculate the number of rounds needed to reach
good security by presenting firstly the mixing time of k-RTS be-
fore introducing ORAM assumptions to reduce the expected time
to achieve randomness.
4.2.1 k-Random Transposition Shuffle. Random Transposition
Shuffles (RTS) arewidely usedmodels in the study of card shuffling.
It consists in a player picking randomly a couple of cards from a
same deck, permuting them according to a coin toss and putting
them back at the same location. These steps, usually called a round,
are then repeated until the deck of cards has been properly shuffled,
i.e. until every card sequence is equally possible.
RTS are natural candidates for amortized ORAMs : the rounds
are independent and can be run by different entities over time. Di-
aconis et al. in 1986 [3] have proved that the RTS mixing time of a
deck of n cards is of the orderO (n logn), we first look at oblivious
k-RTS, an RTS where the client picks and transposes locally k dis-
tinct cards to make the scheme more efficient. We stress the differ-
ence between doing successively k/2 transpositions and what we
call k-RTS: in the first case, an element can be transposed several
times in a row of k/2 transpositions while in k-RTS it is transposed
at most once. The result we present affirms that k-RTS converges
to the uniform distribution more rapidly than repeating normal
RTS.
Security Theorem 1. Mixing time of k-RTS. A k-random per-
mutation shuffle of a n card game reaches the uniform distribution
in τ rounds, such that
E(τ ) < 2n
k
· log(n)
Proof. See Appendix 10.1. 
Remark. This theorem gives an upper bound of the number of
rounds for k/2 disjoint transpositions. However, we use in prac-
tice PRG keys which do not guarantee that k/2 transpositions are
done. The permutation done with the PRG can be decomposed
as a sequence of transpositions which may not be disjoint or of
size k/2. We nevertheless consider that in practice an oblivious k-
RTS implies computation and communication cost of the order of
O
(
n
k
· log(n)
)
.
To simulate the k-RTS over the stratified mix-net we will al-
locate to each mix a range of indices, for instance the mix Mi
fetches from the database the records whose indices are comprised
in Ji · n/m : (i + 1)n/m − 1K. Each mix then fetches its allocated
records and permutes them locally. Finally, all mixes perform the
same public permutation on all the indices to allocate the records
in the next shuffling round and forward the records to the mixes
accordingly. This last permutation is required to simulate the ran-
dom card choice of the classic RTS shuffle.
ALGORITHM 4.1: Public Record Allocation for mix Midx at round rnd
Input: Public seeds σpub,rnd ;
Number of records n;
Number of mixesm;
1 records ← Πσpub,rnd (J1 : nK);
2 alloc ← [];
3 forall i ∈ J1,mK do
4 alloc ← alloc ∪ records[i · n/m : (i + 1) · n/m];
5 alloc[i] ← [alloc[i][j] for j ∈ [1 : n/m] if
alloc[i][j] ∈ [idx · n/m : (idx + 1) · n/m]];
Output: alloc
5
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Whenm mixes perform in parallel the k-RTS, we can improve
in theory by another factorm the eviction computation time. How-
ever to guarantee that no information is leaked to the adversary,
we need each honest mix to perform r = 2m logn rounds, hence
we ask each mix to perform the k-RTS for r rounds.
4.2.2 ObliviousMerge. Before the eviction algorithm is run, the
database can be divided in two sets of records depending onwhether
or not they were retrieved by the user. As such, the database can be
represented as a simple binary array of n bits out of which s are 1s,
the accessed ones, and n−s are 0s, the others. We argue that in this
representation, elements of the same sets are indistinguishable to
the adversary thanks to prior encryptions and permutations and
thus, fewer rounds are necessary to obliviously shuffle the data-
base from this state since we only need to hide from which set the
records are from. Indeed, this assumption significantly reduces the
number of possible orders in the adversarial view, there are
(n
s
)
or-
ders instead of n! (using the Stars and Bars theorem [? ]).
We now consider the RTS process in that scenario and assume
the records (the bits) are re-encrypted before being permuted such
that the merge of the two sets is oblivious to the adversary.
Security Theorem 2. An oblivious merge (OM) of 2 indistin-
guishable sets of respective size n and s elements requires τ rounds of
2-RTS such that any arranging is possible, with
τ (ϵ) ≤ n
2
· log
(n
s
)
Proof. See Appendix 10.2. 
The k-RTS decreased the mixing time by at least a factor k , and
does so independently of the items to shuffle, we make the follow-
ing conjecture.
Security Conjecture 1. A k-oblivious Merge (k-OM) of 2 indis-
tinguishable sets of n and s element requires τ rounds such that any
order is equally possible, with
τ (ϵ) ≤ n
2k
· log
(n
s
)
4.3 Parallel Mix-ORAM
We now consider the shuffling methods with the mix-net in a strat-
ified configuration, where all the mixes perform the same opera-
tions in parallel and forward the output to each other as shown in
Figure 2.
The mixes have each been allocated a chunk of the database
(Midx having [idx · n/m : (idx + 1) · n/m]) and use the public
permutation seeds σpub to compute which records to send to each
mix.
4.3.1 Parallel Layered scheme. In this design, depicted as the
Wrapping phase of Figure 2, the records are still appendedwith a la-
bel and an IV token, encrypted and permuted as in subsection 4.1.1,
however now chunks of the database are assigned and processed
by each mix. Before the eviction, the database is permutedwith the
old seeds σi and encrypted with the old keys ki . Afterwards, the
records are encrypted with both ki and k ′i , permuted with both σi
and σ ′i , and the new indices are saved on the client. As no permuta-
tion layer is ever removed, the record indistinguishability assump-
tion holds, the eviction then consists of r =m/2 log(n/s) rounds.
Mix Instructions. The client needs to send to each mix the session
keys to access the database db , the private and public elements
used to compute the encryption keys, the permutation seeds and
the record allocation αi and βi , the security parameter κ , the num-
ber of records and roundsn and r , and the ordered list = (ports, ips)
of the mixes participating in the eviction. The client thus send :
C → Mi : db, αi , βi , κ, n, r , list
We generate the permutation seeds and encryption keys as before
and furthermore refresh them at each round by blinding the group
elements. Let hb : G∗ → Z∗q be the hash function used for comput-
ing blinding factors, we can then compute recursively the α and β
for the round j + 1 as follows:
αi,0 = д
zi , ssi,0 = y
zi
i,0, ki,0, σi,0 = hkd f (ssi,0, κ)
βi,0 = д
Πj,imj , sk0 = β
mi
i,0 , σpub,0 = hkd f (sk0, κ)
bi, j+1 = hb (αi, j , ssi, j ), αi, j+1 = дziΠk≤jbi,k
bpub, j+1 = hb (skj ), βi, j+1 = дΠk≤jbpub,kΠl,iml
Mix operations. In this scheme, the mix Mi receives a list of en-
crypted record from all mixes or from the database at the first
round. It first merges the records and sorts them to the order given
by the previous public record allocation. It then encrypts each record
and permutes them with the private encryption key and private
permutation seed. It finally blinds the public permutation seeds,
computes the new record allocation and sends the records to the
mixes accordingly, or to the database at the last round.
Client operations. The client can find the record index locally as
it was stored before the eviction. To decrypt a record, the client
uses a similar algorithm to the one used in the cascade configura-
tion. The Parallel Trial and Error algorithm, as described in Algo-
rithm 4.2, now needs to decrypt the records for each eviction and
each rounds, and determines for each round which mix processed
the desired record. The access method is the same as in the Cas-
cade.
Costs. The mix communication cost is (r + 2) · n · b , the mix per-
mutation cost is m log(n/s) · CΠ(n/m) with CΠ(n/m) the cost of
permuting n/m elements and the encryption costm/2 log(n) ·Ccbc
withCcbc the cost of encrypting one data block. The client Lookup
cost is of the order O(1) as the indices, i.e. n logn bit, are stored lo-
cally. The client decryption cost will be talked in Section 6, and the
group elements stored on the client represents 2κm bits.
4.3.2 Parallel Rebuild method. This design, depicted in Figure 2,
is composed of three phases as in the Cascade configuration. How-
ever, we now assign a chunk of the database to each mix which
processes during a specified of rounds r = 2n/k log(n) during each
permutation phase and encrypt some of the records in parallel. Be-
fore the eviction, the records are permuted and encrypted by the
6
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DB
M2
M1
M3
’σi,1’
...
...
...
M2
M1
M3
’σi,r ’
M2
M1
M3
M2
M1
M3
M2
M1
M3
σ ′i,1
...
...
...
M2
M1
M3
σ ′i,r
DB
Unwrapping phase Simple E/D phase Wrapping phase
σpub,1 σpub,r−1 σ
′
pub,1
σ ′
pub,r−1
Figure 2: Parallel Mix-ORAM with 3 mixes.
Rebuild method (all phases) and Layered method (only the Wrapping phase).
ALGORITHM 4.2: Parallel Layered Trial Error Algorithm
Input: Record and index rec, index ;
Shared and private encryption keys kmix,evict ion,round , prv ;
Permutation seeds σ ;
Number of rounds r ;
List of mixes list = (ips, por ts);
1 j, e = 0;
2 r ← decrypt(prv, rec);
3 while rec .data .label ! = i do
4 if e! = 0 then
5 rec ← encrypt(prv, rec);
6 forall j ∈ J1 : r K do
7 m ← retrieve_mix(σ, e, j, index, list );
8 rec ← decrypt(km, e, j, rec);
9 j ← j − 1;
10 rec ← decrypt(prv, rec);
11 e ← e − 1;
Output: rec
mixesMi with the permutation seeds σpub and σi and the encryp-
tion keys ki . Afterwards, the database is encrypted with the keys
k ′i and permuted with the seeds σ
′
pub
and σ ′i .
Mix Instructions. The client sends the same information as in the
Parallel Layered design but with twice the number of group ele-
ments:
C → Mi : db, αi , α ′i , β , β ′, κ, n, r , list
To derive the permutation seeds σ and encryption keys k , we
make use of the random private elements z, i and mi , the public
and private keysy and x as in the Layered method.We furthermore
derive the α r more times for the simple E/D phase.
bi, j+1 = hb (αi, j , ssi, j ), αi, j+1 = дziΠk≤jbi,k
bpub, j+1 = hb (yc , skj ), βi, j+1 = дΠk≤jbpub,kΠl,iml
MixOperations.During the first r rounds, the records are first sorted
according to the previous public record allocation, then unwrapped
(permuted and decrypted with the old keys and seeds) and sent to
the mix-net according to the public record allocation generated
from the blinded public seeds. Then the groups of n/m records
are encrypted and decrypted in m parallel cascades. Finally, the
records are similarly sorted, wrapped (encrypted and permuted
with the new keys and seeds) and sent to the mix-net during the
last r rounds.
Client Operations. To find a record position, the client uses a simi-
lar algorithm as the one used in the Cascade Rebuild scheme. The
Parallel Index Lookup Algorithm, as described in Algorithm 4.3,
however needs to determine at which round where the record was
sent and processed and compute the associated keys and seeds.
These intermediary results, the list of indices, keys and seeds, can
be stored to facilitate the decryption of the record ; the method be-
ing similar to the one used in the Cascade configuration.
ALGORITHM 4.3: Parallel Index Lookup
Input: Private and public seeds σi,round , σround ;
Number of records, mixes and rounds n, m, r ;
Record index index ;
1 mixes ← {, };
2 indices ← {, };
3 forall i ∈ J1, r K do
4 mix ← ⌊index/m⌋ ;
5 mixes ←mixes ∪ {mix };
6 shuf f le ← Πσmix , i (i · n/m, )i + 1) · n/m);
7 index ← i · n/m + shuf f le .index (index );
8 indices ← ∪{index };
9 shuf f le ← Πσi (1,n);
10 index ← shuf f le .index (index );
Output:mixes, indices
Costs. The mix communication cost is (2m + r + 2) · n · b , the mix
permutation cost is 8m logn · CΠ(n/m) with CΠ(n/m) the cost of
permutingn/m elements and the encryption costn(4 logn+2)·Cctr
withCctr the cost of encrypting one data block. The client Lookup
cost is of the order m(CΠ(n) + CΠ(n/m)). The client decryption
cost is (r +m)Cctr , and the group elements stored on the client
represents 2κ(m + 1) bits.
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5 SECURITY ARGUMENT
We first remark that all of the eviction meta data is independent
of data content, as it is entirely determined by the sole parameter
n. The mix instructions are never shared between parties, the keys
and seeds thus remain secret and are refreshed at every round.
Cascade mix-net. In this architecture, the whole database passes
by every mix including the honest one where it is locally permuted
and re-encrypted with the private shared keys. As a polynomial
adversary cannot break the PRF, the database order is kept confi-
dential.
For the Rebuildmethod, the simple Encryption/Decryption phase
ensures that the records are always encrypted as the adversary is
not able to break the double AES encryption.
Parallel mix-net. In this architecture, chunks of the database are
exchanged betweenmixes during r rounds. The adversary can ben-
efit of the fact that some records may never go to the honest mixes
but this happens with negligible probability of p = (e−r /m << 1
with our parameters.
For the Rebuildmethod,we derived the number of rounds needed
to secure our design from the method used in Goodrich 2012 [19]
to quantify the information leakage (see Appendix 10.3) and found
that this number of rounds is sufficient to bound the expected sum
of square error between the card assignment probabilities and the
uniform distribution by at most 1/n2. The simple E/D phase simi-
larly to the Cascade configuration prevents any mix or the adver-
sary from the decrypting the records completelywhen they are not
permuted and thus the leakage of which records were accessed.
For the Layered method, we proposed to use the previous ran-
domness to reduce the number of rounds needed to be close to
the uniform distribution. We can also reuse Goodrich’s proof by
changing the probabilities such thatwi (t) being now the probabil-
ity the ith record at the tth round was in the cache at first and
Φ(t) = Σwi (t) − s/n, we obtain r > m log(n/s) see Appendix 10.2
and Conjecture 1).
6 EVALUATION
Layered method.We look here at the average number of encryp-
tion layers e a record has before being decrypted. Making the as-
sumption that the record access distribution is uniform, we can rep-
resent the problemof accessing all records at least once as a coupon
collector problem. In that case, the average number of evictions
before all records have been fetched once is E[eall ] ≤ (n/s) · Hn
with Hn the nth harmonic number. The expected number of en-
cryption layers per record before decryption is however E[r ] ≤
r/s ·
(
n+1
2 · (Hn − 1/2) + 1/2
)
. For n = 106 and s =
√
n, we have
E[e] ≈ 15 · 103 and E[r ] ≈ 7 · 103 · r .
Proof. Lets τn be the randomnumber of coupons collectedwhen
the first set contains every n types. We have, E[τn] = n
∑n
i=1
1
i =
n · Hn . Since we fetch s unique records per eviction (we cannot
fetch a record already in the stash), the previous result is an up-
per bound of the number of requests needed and so the expected
number of eviction is E[eall ] ≤ n/s Hn .
We now want to find the average number of encryption layers
per record before decryption, this is equivalent to finding the aver-
age number of evictions before a record is deciphered. Hence we
have, E[e] ≤ r/s · ∑ni=1 E[τi ] = r/s ∑ni=1 ( (n+1−i )(n+i )2 · 1i ) from
which can be calculated the result presented earlier. 
To reduce these numbers, we can modify the access method as
follows. When the client requests a record from the database, d
other records are chosen uniformly at random from the set of un-
accessed records. These records are then fetched, their encryption
is refreshed as written previously and the client overwrites with
these records their older version on the database. Doing so, with d
high enough, yields a better approximation of the uniform distri-
bution assumption and we would obtain E[eall ] ≤ n/(sd) ·Hn and
E[e] ≤ r/(sd) · [n+12 · (Hn − 1/2) + 1/2] Hn . With d = √n, we now
have E[eall ] ≤ 15r and E[e] ≤ 7r .
Another method to reduce the decryption cost would be to reini-
tialize the database periodically, for instance every e eviction. Do-
ing so, the client would only need to decipher each record a maxi-
mum of e ·m times for the Cascade architecture and e · r times for
the Parallel architecture during the reinitialization process and in
the decryption method.
7 COMPARISON
We can find in Table 2 and Table 3 the cost comparisons of the
different Mix-ORAM designs. We did not include the public per-
mutation costs in the Parallel cases as they can be done offline, or
during the records’ exchange at each round, since the permutation
is done on the range of indices and not on the data. We can see
that the Layered method is more efficient than the Rebuild one in
theory, however we have to take into account in practice the added
cost due to the fact that the whole database may not fit in the cache
of the mixes (the time needed to fetch the records from the main
memory). Moreover, the client incurs higher costs, both in term of
memory and computation, with the Layered method. Comparison
of our schemes. The mix cost in the Cascade architecture are qua-
dratic in the number of mixes m while they could be considered
independent ofm in the Parallel case. Hence, the Parallel architec-
ture, even if it has a higher number of rounds, can still be faster
than the Cascade depending on the siwe of the network and of the
cache for the Layered method.
Comparing the computation and communication costs of our
designs to existing eviction schemes would be interesting but del-
icate as we take into account the fact that the mixes may have
faster processor or larger RAM and that the bandwidth in the mix-
net may be higher than the one between the client and the ORAM
process thus speeding the eviction. The total communication or
computation cost of each of our design is indeed higher than regu-
lar evictions’ such as Melbourne’s [28]. However, in our cases, the
client only needs to preprocess the database once, and with the pe-
riodic reinitialization of the database in the Layered approach, and
has manageable additional costs for the lookup and description of
a record. These costs do not compare with the overhead of the pe-
riodic eviction incurred by the client in the non delegated schemes
eviction.
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Cascade - Layered Cascade - Rebuild
Mix memory n n
Mix Encryption cost m · n 4m · n
Mix Permutation cost mn ·CΠ(n) 2mnCΠ(n)
Mix Communication cost (m + 1) ·Ccom(n) 3m ·Ccom(n)
Client Lookup overhead O(1) m ·CΠ(n)
Client Decryption overhead ∼ nm2s Hn 2m
Client Storage overhead n log(n) + 2κm 2κm
Table 2: Cost comparison of the designs with CE the cost of 1 encryption, CΠ(x) the permutation cost and Ccom(x) the
communication cost of x records in the scheme.
Parallel - Layered Parallel - Rebuild
#Rounds (r ) m2 log
(n
s
)
2m log(n)
Mix memory n/m n/m
Mix Encryption cost n2 log
(n
s
)
n(4 log(n) + 2)
Mix Permutation cost m log
(n
s
) ·CΠ ( nm ) 8m log(n) ·CΠ ( nm )
Mix Communication cost m(r + 2) ·Ccom
( n
m
)
m(2r +m + 2) ·Ccom
( n
m
)
Client Lookup overhead O(1) m · [CΠ
( n
m
)
h + 2CΠ(n)]
Client Decryption overhead ∼ nr2s Hn m + r
Client Storage overhead n log(n) + 2κ(m + 1) 2κ(m + 1)
Table 3: Cost comparison of the designs with CE the cost of 1 encryption, CΠ(x) the permutation cost and Ccom(x) the
communication cost of x records in the scheme.
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9 CONCLUSION
We presented in this paper a novel ORAM eviction system where
the randomization, more specifically the oblivious shuffle, is dele-
gated to a semi-trusted mix-net. Doing so, the client is alleviated
from the main overhead of the ORAM technology at the cost of
reasonable additional costs for the record lookup and decryption.
Very thin clients can thus accede to the ORAM technology as only
a few group elements are needed for fetching any records. The
database is moreover accessible and can be made available during
the eviction of the records, and this independent of the structure of
the underlying ORAM server, making the ORAM technology more
portable.
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10 APPENDIX
10.1 Proof k-RTS
Proof. To prove the upper bound,we useDiaconis et al. method [3]
which consists in marking cards depending on whether they have
already been picked or not. Let’s define τ the stopping time, i.e. the
time when every card has been marked and τi the number of trans-
positions before i cards have been marked. The τi are independent
geometric variables with probability of success pt as implied by
the game rules. We thus have,
pt =
min(k,n−t )∑
i=1
(
k
i
)
·
(
t + 1
i
)
·
(
n − t
i
)
·
(
n
i
)−2
=
1
n2
· (k · (t + 1) · (n − t) + αn,t,k )
With αn,t,k = O
(
n−k
)
positive.
We can thus rewrite τ ’s expectation as following.
E(τ ) = E
(
n−1∑
i=0
τi
)
=
n−1∑
t=0
1
pt
<
n−1∑
t=0
n2
k · (t + 1) · (n − t)
<
2
k
· n
2
n + 1
·
(
ln(n) + γ + O( 1
n
)
)
, γ = lim
n→∞Hn − ln(n)

10.2 Proof of Oblivious Merge
Proof. We want to find the mixing time τ (ϵ) of our oblivious
merge of two sets of indistinguishable elements. To do so, we use
the bound of the mixing time of an irreducible ergodic Markov
Chain, where p = 1|V | , with the volume V =
(n
s
)
, and 1 − λ∗ is the
spectral gap, we thus have,
λ∗
1 − λ∗ · log
(
1
2ϵ
)
≤ τ (ϵ) ≤ 1
1 − λ∗ · log
(
1
2ϵ · √p
)
We now represent the arranging of merge of the 2 distinct sets
by the graph G, a k-regular graph withv vertices corresponding to
the different orderings and the undirected edges to transpositions
of two elements. By definition, the eigenvalues of the transition
matrix of the G are k = λ′0 > λ′1 ≥ ... ≥ λ′n−1, and we have,
diam (G) ≤ loд(v − 1)
loд( k
λ′∗ )
+ 1 with λ′∗ =maxi,0(λ′i ) = k · λ∗
From which we can deduce that λ∗ ≥ ( (ns ) − 1) 11−s ≥ (n ·es ) s1−s
since diam (G) = s the diameter of the graph, v = (ns ) the number
of vertices and k = s · (n − s).
To find an upper-bound of λ∗, we will now look at spectral gap
bounding. Let’s G0,1 = {0, 1}n be the group of elements with the
XOR operation and S = {x ∈ G, weiдht(x) = s} the symmetric
subset ofG of n-binary arraywith s 1s andn−s 0s.We callCayn,s =
Graph
(G0,1,S) the Cayley graph generated from these structures.
Lemma 10.1. Let G be a finite Abelian group, χ : G → C be a
character of G, S ⊆ G be a symmetric set. Let M be the normalized
adjacency matrix of the Cayley graph G = Cay(G,S). Consider the
10
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vector x ∈ CG such that xa = χ (a). Then x is an eigenvector of G,
with eigenvalue
1
S
∑
s ∈S
χ (s)
Theorem10.2. TheCayley graphCayn,s has for eigenvalues µ0 =
1 > µ1 ≥ ... ≥ µn−1 with,
µr =
1
|S|
min(r ,n−r )∑
i=1
(−1)i
(
r
i
) (
n − r
s − i
)
Proof. ∀r ∈ {0, 1}n , with χr (x) = (−1)
∑
ri ·xi , we have,
µr =
1
S
∑
s ∈S
χ (s) = 1|S|
∑
s ∈S
(−1)
∑
ri ·si
=
1
|S|
min(r ,s)∑
i=1
(−1)i
(
r
i
) (
n − r
s − i
)

Remark. We recognize here the Vandermonde identity with al-
ternating numbers. We argue that the eigenvalues of the Cayley
graphCayn,s are all positive as the smallest eigenvalue is null. For
r = n − r , the expression simplifies to µr =
( r
n
2
)
if n even, 0 oth-
erwise. For r = 1, the expression simplifies to µ1 = 1 − 2 · sn , the
spectral gap of Cayn,s is thus equal to 2 · sn .
We notice that the first graphG actually is a sub-graph ofCayn,s
and as such the adjacent matrix of the first graph is included in the
second’s. For s > 1,Cayn,s is divided in two sub-graphs represent-
ing the cosets of {0, 1}n as S is not a generating group of G0,1, G
is only contained in one of the sub-graphs. We use the Cauchy’s
Interlace Theorem to bound the eigenvalues of G with the ones of
Cayn,s ,.
Theorem 10.3. Let M be a Hermitian n × n matrix with eigen-
values µ′0 ≥ ... ≥ µ′n−1 and N a m ×m sub-matrix of M with
eigenvalues λ′0 ≥ ... ≥ λ′m−1 , we have
µ′i ≥ λ′i ≥ µ′n−m+i+1
We are here only interested in an upper-bound of λ∗, as we have
µ2n+2−(ns ) ≤ λ1 ≤ 1 − 2
s
n and 0 ≤ λn ≤ µ2, λ∗ ≤ 1 − 2 sn . We thus
have 11−λ∗ ≤ n2·s and log
(n
s
) ≈ s(log(n/s − 0.5) + 1) − 1/2 log(2πs)
when n ≫ s from which we derive the final result. 
10.3 Proof of Parallel mix-net
Proof. This proof is derived fromGoodrich et al [20]who bounded
the closeness of a shuffle to the uniform distribution using a com-
promised parallel mix-net.
Letwi (t) the probability the ith record at the tth round was the
first record at start, the sum of square metric Φ(t) = Σni=1(wi (t) −
1/n)2, n the number of cards,m the number of mixes out of which
ma are corrupted and k = n/m.
We have by recurrence that the potential ∆Φ∗ changes when a
group of K card is shuffled during a round as following : ∆Φ∗ =
Σ1≤i≤n (wi −wj )2. Thereby,
E[∆Φ] = m
n
∑
1≤i≤n
Pr((i, j) in the same honest mix)(wi −wj )2
=
k − 1
k(n − 1) ·
m −ma
m
∑
i<j
(wi −wj )2
E[∆Φ
Φ
] = (m −ma )(k − 1)
2n(n − 1)
∑
i, j ((wi − 1/n) − (wj − 1/n))2∑
k (wk − 1/n)2
=
(m −ma )(k − 1)
n − 1 since
∑
k
wk − 1/n = 0
We thus find,
E[Φ(t + 1)] = (1 − (m −ma)(k − 1)
n − 1 )E[Φ(t)]
E[Φ(t)] = (1 − (m −ma)(k − 1)
n − 1 )
t
We want to find the conditions on c such that the corrupted
parallel mix-net can mix in t = bc log(n) such that E[Φ(t)] < n−b .
E[Φ(t)] = (1 − (m −ma)(k − 1)
n − 1 )
t
< n−b
c · log(1 + 1
n−1
(m−ma )(k−1) − 1
) > 1
Using Taylor series, assuming that n − 1 ≫ (m −ma )(k − 1), we
finally get
c · ( 1
n−1
(m−ma )(k−1) − 1
+ o(n/k)) > 1
c >
n − 1
(m −ma)(k − 1) − 1 ≃
m
m −ma − o(1)
Thus, when shuffling n cards with n a parallel mix-net composed
of m mixes out of which ma were compromised, we need t >
b · mm−ma log(n) rounds before the expected sum of squares error
E[Φ(t)] between the card assignment probabilities and the uniform
distribution is at most 1/nb for any fixed b > 1. 
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